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Abstract
Human rights issues have become a common topic that continuously being discussed around the 
world. The major concern of international community on the protection of basic human rights 
leads to a challenge for the nation state to fulfill its commitment to protect the basic rights of 
their people from the possibility of harm that comes from internally or externally. Meanwhile, the 
principle of mutual understanding and respect among states and non-interference to domestic 
affairs of particular state has been generally recognized as the main principle in international law. 
Sometimes, a conflict that occurred inside a state, which is theoretically becomes a domestic 
issue, could be escalated and become a mutual concern of international society. When a human 
right violation occurred inside a state, ideally international community can not only ‘sit and 
watch’. Especially when the violations are classified as grave breaches of human rights. The world 
community has a moral obligation to offer an assistance and search a solution to end that violations. 
It is cleary noted that Article 2 (4) and Article 2 (7) United Nations (UN) Charter should not 
be regarded as an absolute prohibition of interference. Those articles are the limitation so that the 
intervention should not endangered territorial integrity, political independence and not contrary 
to the purposes of UN. However, the territorial integrity would be broken if the state lose their 
territory permanently, and in the context of humanitarian intervention there is no taking over 
a territory, since the main purpose is only to restore the condition as a result of human rights 
violation that occurred. Based on this assumption so intervention not contrary to UN Charter. One 
thing should be emphasized is that the requirements for intervention have to be very clear.
Following an unsettled debate on criterion of humanitarian intervention, a few years ago 
there were a new concept which is believed as an improvement or a ‘new face’ from humanitarian 
intervention. It called the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. Generally, both of these concepts 
have similarity, especially with the main purpose on guarantee basic human rights and provide 
such protection when the authorized government is unable and unwilling to do so. However, the 
RtoP doctrine can not also avoid its controversy. The main discussion on this doctrine particularly 
questioning the legal status of this doctrine in international law and whether RtoP is only a new 
form of humanitarian intervention.
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Tanggung Jawab Melindungi : Bentuk Baru dari Intervensi Kemanusiaan?
Abstrak
Isu mengenai HAM telah menjadi topik umum yang terus menerus didiskusikan diseluruh 
dunia. Perhatian utama dari komunitas internasional dalam hal perlindungan mendasar HAM 
selanjutnya menantang negara-negara untuk melakukan pemenuhan komitmen mereka agar 
melakukan perlindungan hak-hak mendasar dan tindakan yang dapat mengancam baik secara 
internal maupun secara eksternal. Sementara itu prinsip salaing pengertian dan penghargaan 
antar negara, prinsip non-intervensi dalam hubungan domestik telah diakui sebagai prinsip utama 
dalam hukum internasional. Kadang, konflik yang lahir di dalam negeri, yang secara teori adalah 
konflik domestik, dapat menjadi perhatian bersama masyarakat internasional. Pada saat terjadi 
pelanggaran HAM didalam suatu negara, seharusnya komunitas internasional tidak hanya ‘duduk 
dan melihat’. Khususnya pada saat terjadi pelanggaran yang dikategorikan sebagai pelanggaran 
berat terhadap HAM. Komunitas negara mempunyai kewajiban moral untuk menawarkan bantuan 
dan mencari solusi untuk mengakhiri pelanggaran tersebut.
Seperti yang dijelaskan dalam Pasal 2 (4) dan Pasal 2 (7) Piagam PBB, pasal-pasal ini tidak 
dapat diangap sebagai larangan absolut intervensi. Pasal-pasal tersebut adalah pembatasan 
sehingga intervensi tidak membahayakan integritas wilayah, indpendensi politik dan tidak 
bertentangan dengan tuujuan PBB. Meskipun demikian, integritas wilayah dapat hilang apabila 
negara kehilangan wilayahnya secara permanen, dan dalam konteks intervensi kemanusiaan 
tidak ada pengambilalihan wilayah, karena tujuan utamanya hanya untuk mengembalikan 
kedaaan pada saat terjadinya pelanggaran HAM. Berdasarkan asumsi tersebut, maka intervensi 
tidak bertentangan dengan Piagam PBB. Hal lain yang harus diperjelas bahwa alasan intervensi 
haruslah jelas.
Mengikuti perdebatan yang tidak kunjung sellesai tentang kriteria intervensi kemanusiaan, 
beberapa tahun yang lalu dibuatlah suatu konsep yang dianggap sebagai wajah baru dari 
intervensi kemanusiaan. Secara umum, kedua konsep ini mempunyai kesamaan, terutama 
dengan tujuan utama dalam menjamin HAM dan menyediakan sejumlah perlindungan pada saat 
pemerintah yang berwenang tidak mampu dan tidak dapat memberikan jaminan HAM. Meskipun 
demikian, doktin RtoP tidak dapat terhindar dari kontroversi. Diskusi utama dari doktrin ini adalah 
pertanyaan tentang status hukum dari doktrin hukum internasional dan apakah RtoP merupakan 
bentuk lain dari intervensi kemanusiaaan.
Kata kunci: intervensi kemanusiaan, tanggung jawab untuk melindungi (R2P), kewajiban 
perlindungan, non intervensi¸ hukum kebiasaan internasional.
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A. Introduction
State is a bearer of duty and rights in 
international law. In order to exercise its 
duty and rights, a state requires sovereignty. 
The sovereignty of a state is a vital element, 
necessary for a state to establish international 
relationship. An independent or sovereign 
state which already fulfilled the requirements 
for its establishment as dictated in The 1933 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States1 should be considered to have an equal 
position with other states. 
A sovereign state is one which has 
supreme power. Based on history, the word 
sovereignty was derived from Latin word 
superanus, means the topmost. According to 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, the space limiting 
such supreme power of a state is the borderline 
of the state itself. This means that the 
sovereignty of a state is confined only within its 
own area; its supremacy ends as soon as it hits 
the borderline to the sovereignty of another 
state2. This limitation of powers signifies that 
the sovereignty of a state does not apply or 
stops as soon as it crosses the sovereignty of 
another state.
This principle of state’s sovereignty is, in a 
way, in line with the non-intervention principle 
which has embodied in international law. The 
principle of non interference on domestic 
affairs of another state is the consequence of 
the formulation of the states as equal, as found 
in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. However, in 
the context of human rights law, it has been 
interpreted that states can no longer use non-
intervention reasons against the repressive 
actions of a country towards its citizens or even 
against human rights violation conducted in a 
state of international concern.3 For example, 
if a state declared itself being bound to an 
international agreement concerning human 
rights while the agreement recognizes individual 
complaint, the filing of individual complaint by 
a citizen based on such agreement cannot be 
considered violation of domestic affairs.
It takes quite some time for international 
community to admit that widespread violence 
happening all across the globe require 
international attention. The supremacy of a 
state over its own internal, domestic affairs 
should not be allowed to justify such conducts 
of violence. Mass murdering, forced migration, 
sexual assault in great scale, and act of 
vandalism have been occurring for years since 
the beginning of civilization. The international 
society has gradually shown better concern on 
this matter, and real actions have been taken by 
international community since the World War II 
to protect every individual from violence, during 
either peace or war. However, it is not easy to 
unite the perception of every single member 
of international community in responding to 
the violence. Until the 21st century, there has 
not yet been any agreement on the general 
mechanism to solve such issue.
The large number of the acts of violence 
happening all across the globe has drawn 
the sympathy of the UN as an international 
organization. As stated by Kofi Annan in the 
Millennium Report of the Secretary-General 
1 The requirement for establishment of a state based on Montevido Convention 1933 are: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government; (d) capacity to enter into relationship with other state. The first three elements has already accepted as 
general practice in international law and widely known as the doctrine of three elemets that formulated by George Jellinek by the end 
of 19 century (in Peter Malanczuk, Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition, London and New York: Routledge, 1997).
2 Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Etty R. Agoes, Pengantar Hukum Internasional, Bandung: Alumni, 2003, p. 18.
3 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6th edition, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 273.
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of the United Nations, 2000: “If humanitarian 
intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault 
on sovereignty, how should we respond to a 
Rwanda, to a Sebrenica-to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that offend every 
precept of our common humanity?”
Kofi’s statement spawned from the 
dilemma of whether the world should stand 
idly by the violation of human rights occurring 
across the globe. However, some efforts have 
been done since 1990, especially on the matter 
of gathering consensus of the world in order 
to respond to such violation of human rights 
which threaten individual freedom. Bernard 
Kouchner, a French Physicist, humanitarian 
activist, and minister, was the first to coin 
the idea of ‘the right to intervene’, which 
unfortunately did not attain the support of the 
states4. Despite this lack of support, a change 
was made in the practice of the UN’s Security 
Council in the 1900s when conceptualizing 
humanitarian emergencies within a country 
that could rightly be considered as threatening 
global peace and security. This change was in 
the Resolution 688, April 5 1991 issued by the 
UN’s Security Council. The content declared that 
the conduct of the Iraqi government against its 
own refugees was a threat against world peace. 
Thus, the resolution legitimated military action 
based on Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. The 
Security Council urged Iraq to stop its violation 
against human rights in its own border and to 
agree on giving humanitarian support. This was 
the first time the Security Council of the UN 
ever recognized a repressing action of a state as 
a threat to global peace and security.5
A breakthrough did not appear until 
2001 when the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
offered a new concept of ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ or RtoP declaring that nations or 
states have the duty to prevent and to respond 
to the violation of human rights in their 
respective borders. Less than four years after 
its conception, in the World Summit attended 
by the head of nations at General Assembly 
meeting, the RtoP concept was then formally 
introduced.
The concept of RtoP was expected to 
answer the question of how far actually can 
the Security Council as guardian of peace and 
security could carry out is duty, as well as to 
limit the intervention of states in the domestic 
affairs of a particular state. Among the reasons 
behind the formulation of this concept was the 
violation by countries of NATO against Yugoslavia 
in March, 1999. The violation was in the form of 
bombing, with the protection of the country’s 
minority backing as the justifying reason. The 
conduct of NATO was quite controversial, as the 
bombing was without authorization from the 
Security Council of the UN, and no sanction has 
ever been taken.
In this article, the author would discuss 
the issue of humanitarian intervention in its 
relation with basic principles of international 
law: non-intervention principle. It is clear that 
the sovereignty of a state should be protected 
from the intervention of other states, which 
has become a principle recognized by states 
around the world. It, however, spawns an issue: 
Is the concept of humanitarian intervention 
4 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
2008, p. 32. 
5 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a new Norm of Military 
Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society” in Jeniffer M. Welsh (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 33.
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now being used as a weapon for violating the 
sovereignty of states? Moreover, responding 
to the latest development in the promotion 
of the RtoP doctrine over humanitarian 
intervention has spawned a question: Is the 
concept applicable, based on its theoretical and 
practical aspects? And, what is the current legal 
status of this doctrine? 
B. Non-Intervention Principle as a Challenge 
for Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine in 
International Law
The improving international relationship 
among nations in this era of globalization has 
made the world a ‘smaller’ place. The intensity 
of economic and socio-political relationship 
has made the issue concerning human rights 
develop quicker and become easier to detect. 
The internationalization of human rights has 
promoted the violation of human rights issue 
as a common concern of the international 
community to tackle the issue, and to provide 
effective and quick response to protect the 
victims.
Since its formation 1945, the UN has 
shown considerable amount of efforts in 
tackling issues concerning violation of human 
rights. Unfortunately, the efforts have been 
only effective for only numerous cases, the 
collective security initiated by the UN has failed 
to solve the issues of violations of human rights 
in Cambodia,  Rwanda, Somalia, and other 
places.
When the UN or other regional security 
mechanism failed to prevent violation of human 
rights carried out within a particular country, the 
International Community should not sit idly by 
such reality. This statement has naturally led to 
the formulation of ‘humanitarian intervention’. 
It has been considered (although through 
heated debate) as an exception to the non-
interventionprinciple as found in Article 2 (7) of 
the UN charter. This humanitarian intervention 
has to be distinguished with the ability of a 
state to protect its citizens in foreign countries.6
It is vital to distinguish between 
collective securities formed by the UN with 
regional mechanism like peace keeping, peace 
enforcement, or other missions by the UN 
peacekeepers whose nature is multilateral 
with humanitarian intervention developing far 
before 1945 which was more unilateral-a result 
of cooperation between the armies of several 
states to challenge another state on the basis of 
humanitarianism, democracy, or basic human 
rights. 
As an illustration, consider a state A 
conducts a violation of human rights or violation 
against international humanitarian law against 
its citizens in consistently or systematically. The 
supporters of the humanitarian intervention 
doctrine would agree on the basis of the 
international customary law to justify another 
state B to take military action into the border of 
A, even without the permission of the state A, 
in order to protect the citizens of the state A.7 
This concept of intervention could simply 
be understood as an effort to participate or 
intervene with the domestic affairs of another 
country. Intervention could be defined as any 
external attempt from subject of international 
6 John O’Brian, Op. Cit., p. 685.
7 Lyal S. Sunga, “The Role of Humanitarian Intervention in International Peace and Security: Guarantee or Threat?”, in Hans Kochler 
(ed.), The Use of Force in International Relations-Challenges to Collective Security, Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2006, 
p. 44.
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law in international relationship that could affect 
an outcome of a particular issue happening 
in a sovereign state. In Black’s Law Dictionary, 
intervention is defined as the meddling of a 
state with the affair in the border of another 
state by the use of threat or power.
Lauterpacht defines intervention as a 
interfering of a state into the domestic affair 
of another state with the good intention to 
preserve or to alter the condition, situation, 
or goods in the particular state.8 Meanwhile, 
Starke formulates three types of intervention 
done by a state towards another state:
1. Internal intervention, intervention done by 
a state towards the internal or domestic 
affairs of another state;
2. External intervention, intervention by a 
state towards the external affairs between 
two states. Ex: the involvement of Italy 
which supported Germany in the World 
War II;
3. Punitive Intervention, intervention of a 
state towards another state as a form of 
retaliation.9
In the typological division of intervention, Starke 
intends to make legal the intervention of a 
state towards the sovereignty of another state. 
Starke argues that there are some cases where 
intervention could be justified by international 
law. Those cases are:10 
1. Collective intervention as regulated in the 
UN Charter;
2. To prevent interest, rights, and safety of the 
citizens of a state in another state;
3. Self-defense. If intervention is required 
immediately in case of armed attack. The 
requirements of such self-defense is that it 
is immediate, no other means are available, 
no time to reconsider;
4. Related to protectorate of its dominion;
5. If the intervened state is considered to 
have conducted a serious violation of 
international law.
Before being allowed to execute the exceptional 
rights, the states have to heed the primary 
duty as instructed in the UN Charter, so that, 
except the Charter instructs otherwise, the 
intervention should not develop into threat 
or violence against territorial integration or 
political freedom of any nations.11 
The UN Charter has specifically 
accommodated the sovereign equality among 
states and forbidden the intervention towards 
domestic affairs of other states, as instructed 
in the Article 2 (1): “The organization is based 
on the principle of sovereign equality of all the 
members.”
and Article 2 (7):
“Nothing contained in the present charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the members to 
submit such matters to settlement under 
the present charter, but the principle 
shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under chapter 
VII.”
The charter clearly specified that in 
international relationships there should be no 
intervention at all. Such regulation is supported 
by the Resolution of the General Assembly of 
8 Huala Adolf, Aspek-Aspek Negara dalam Hukum Internasional, cetakan ketiga, Jakarta: PT. RajaGrafindoPersada, 2002, p. 31. 
9 J. G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law 3rd Edition, London: Butterworth & Co Ltd, 1954, p. 89-90. 
10 Ibid.,p. 90. 
11 See Article 2 (4) Piagam PBB. 
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United Nations 2625 (XXV)  issued on October 
24, 1970, later formulated as the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of The 
United Nations.
In practice, the principle of non intervention 
is often violated by states under humanitarian 
reasons. The humanitarian intervention of Iraq 
in 1991, Somalia in 1992, and Kosovo in 1999 
are proofs that the doctrine is conducted by 
states in their international relationship. The 
legitimation of this humanitarian intervention 
is based on the interpretation of Article 2 (4) of 
the UN Charter.12 Article 2 (4) is not an absolute 
prohibition, rather it is a mechanism to limit 
intervention so not to violate territorial integrity, 
political independence, and the purpose of the 
UN. Territorial integrity means that a state loses 
its territory permanently; while in humanitarian 
intervention the intervening party does not 
take territories permanently. The intervention 
has only the purpose of restoring the condition 
regarding the fulfillment of human rights in a 
state. Every state with its respective citizens 
retains their political freedom. Therefore, by 
this assumption, humanitarian intervention 
does not violate the UN Charter.
Moreover, according to the classification 
of Starke, the doctrine of intervention is not fully 
prohibited. There is a hole in the mechanism 
of international law allowing intervention to 
happen. In Starke’s classification, humanitarian 
intervention can be categorized into the last 
classification concerning state conducting 
violation against human rights. The conduct of 
systematic and structural violation of human 
rights by a state is considered a serious crime 
against international law. Meanwhile, according 
to Teson, there are several aspects considered 
normal in the international custom related with 
humanitarian intervention. First is concerning 
the use of force by a state against the domestic 
affair of another state. Second is concerning the 
humanitarian value to be used as justification of 
the use of force.13 
It is clear that the context of humanitarian 
intervention points to different matter than 
that in the Article 2 (7) of UN Charter, due to the 
humanitarian basis to justify the intervention, 
not because of political or other kind of interests 
prohibited by international law. Humanitarian 
intervention, thus, could be defined as followed:
“Humanitarian intervention is the 
intervention into the territorial state by 
another state or a collective of states... 
for the promotion or protection of basic 
human rights where the territorial state 
is perpetuating abuse or is unable to 
provide the necessary protection to its 
inhabitant.”14 
Holzgrefe also defines humanitarian 
intervention as:
“...the threat or use of force across state 
borders by a state (or group of states) 
aimed at preventing or ending widespread 
and grave violations of the fundamental 
human rights of individuals other than its 
citizens, without permission of the state 
within those territory force is applied.”15 
12 Yoram Disntein, War, Agreesion and Self Defence, Second Edition, Australia: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 89. 
13 Eric Adjei, ”The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention”, Thesis, University of Georgia, 2005, p. 29. 
14 Beth Van Schaack and Ronald C.Slye, International Criminal Law and Its Enforcement: Cases and Material, 2nd edition, 2010, p. 291.
15 J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, “in JL. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane , Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas, London, New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 8.
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From the above definition, it can be inferred 
that an intervention normally harms the 
sovereignty of a state, also intervention is 
often done through threat or the use of force. 
Meanwhile, humanitarian intervention utilizes 
humanitarian motive to justify itself, that it is 
necessary in order to protect people whose 
rights are violated by their own government. 
This motivation underlying humanitarian 
intervention is, among others, utilized in order 
to stabilize a situation resulted from a conflict. 
Humanitarian intervention is there to prevent 
bloodshed from two conflicting parties and to 
prevent war.
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
is also considered an exception towards the 
general principle of international law, which is 
the prohibition of the use of force in international 
relation. Humanitarian intervention should not 
be identical with military action carried out 
by a state to protect its people, recognized as 
a justification of self-defense in international 
law. Meanwhile, in order to be categorized as 
humanitarian intervention, intervention using 
force should have a humanitarian purpose, not 
only for the interest of a single party. Also, the 
one benefits from it should not the people of 
intervening state.16 
The context of humanitarian intervention 
originated from the support for the doctrine of 
just war. St. Augustine was the first to propose 
the term just war and to mention the criteria 
to limit it. The concept was further developed 
by St. Thomas Aquinas by the end of 1200s.17 
Grotius argued in his Laws of War and Peace 
published in 1625 that the legal status of the 
use of force in international relation has to be 
based on appropriate motives or reasons to 
start a war. In his natural law theory, Grotius 
considered that the cause must be serious to 
justify the use of force. Also, all other measures 
must have been attempted before the option of 
war is to be considered.
In practice, during the 19th century, 
the intervention carried out by the western 
countries to protect the Christian and minority 
in the Ottoman Empire, was considered to 
have a humanitarian cause.18 Two situations 
representing the practices of humanitarian 
intervention after 1945 were the invasion of India 
to Bangladesh in 1971, and the humanitarian 
invasion of Tanzania to Uganda 1979. However, 
these acts of intervention were questioned in 
regard to them being practiced by humanitarian 
cause. The people of East Bengal and Uganda, 
India, and Tanzania deemed it undeserving to 
use the term humanitarian intervention for 
their acts. Instead, they propose right to self-
defense based on the Article 51 of UN Charter 
as their justifying platform.
The test for legality of intervention 
towards territorial integrity of a state based 
on humanitarian reasons shown in the case of 
the repressive act of NATO towards Kosovo in 
1999,19 which had sparked continuing debate 
on the issue of whether Article 2 (4) allows the 
16 Ibid., p. 45.
17 First of all, individual is not allowed to start a war, instead it is on the authorized authority; secondly, the cause of war should be 
appropriate and proportional; third, the parties of the conflict have the same intention to resort to war and not based on illegitimate 
reasons.
18 David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, seventh edition, London: Thomson Reuters (legal) limited, 2010, p. 777.
19 Humanitarian intervention conducted by NATO was a reaction to governent of FRY against ethnic Albania (which is a majority of more 
or less 90% of population in Kosovo), an autonomy province of FRY that belongs to Serbia. The action taken by FRY was escalated 
resulting 45 civilians being killed in city of Racak in January 1999. The proposal of NATO submitted to FRY to withdraw its troops from 
Padjadjaran Journal of International Law
Volume 1, Number 1, January 2017
58
use of force in humanitarian intervention. The 
event has also created gap between the state 
members of NATO with China, Russia, and non-
block Countries.20 
To prevent the irresponsible use of 
humanitarian intervention, a guide is necessary 
to determine the legitimacy of its conduct. The 
guiding principles of humanitarian intervention 
has been given to the General Assembly of UN 
by United Kingdom, to be used as reference by 
the international community. The important 
principles are as followed:21 
1. Every intervention, according to its 
definition, is an acceptance towards 
the failure of prevention measures. An 
improvement on the system of conflict 
prevention is, therefore, necessary. The 
development of policy that could eliminate 
the factors of conflict is required;
2. Primary principle that the use of force is 
only the last resort has to be maintained;
3. The responsibility to stop ongoing conflicts 
essentially belongs to the state where 
the conflict occurs. If the said state lacks 
the means or measures to solve the 
conflict within its border, the international 
community can offer their help;
4. When facing serious human rights violation, 
while the system governing the state within 
which the problem occurs shows inability 
or lack of willingness to take actions, 
international community are allowed 
to intervene. Intervention towards the 
domestic affairs is a sensitive matter. Thus, 
a strong and convincing evidence that a 
serious human rights violation is happening 
is necessary to justify intervention;
5. The use of force has to be proportional in 
order to attain the humanitarian purpose, 
and its protocol of procedure must refer to 
the international law.
Every use of force has to be done collectively. 
There is no single state with the right to carry 
out intervention representing the international 
community as a whole.
This guideline proposed by United Kingdom 
appears to be a step forward to regulate the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, by 
providing a high threshold and by specifically 
regulating the boundary of the parties exercising 
the intervention. It is expected that intervention 
would not carry ulterior political agenda. 
However, a stronger, more binding instrument 
that could accommodate this guideline has to 
be appraised by the international community, 
so that it could become a hard law to bind the 
states across the globe.
C. Responsibility to Protect (RtoP): an Old 
Concept with a New Name?
State has the primary responsibility to protect 
its citizen under any conditions. At times, the 
government could pose a threat for its citizens 
by conducting a serious act of repressions, 
or violation of human rights calling for 
international concern. 
Kosovo has been declined by President Milosevic. Furthermore, NATO conducted air bombing for 78 days within Balgrade as the 
main target and other part of the FRY. That caused a lot of civilians being killed and hardly injured, but it succesfully resulted on the 
surrender of FRY. However, NATO had never given a clarification with regard to its use of force as well as its legal basis for conducting 
such military actions. 
20 Christine Gray, “The Use of Force and International Legal Order”, in  Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003, p. 595.
21 Mr. Robin Cook, “Speech”, United Kingdom Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, 19 Juyi 2002, in David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, seventh edition, London: Thomson Reuters (legal) 
limited, 2010.
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The concept of RtoP is a new approach 
for the protection of society from violation of 
human rights. The basic concept of R2P could 
be applied when a state could no longer or 
no longer wants to protect its citizens from 
violation of human rights that could result in the 
great loss of lives. In such case, the international 
community has the duty to protect and has the 
right to intervene justified by humanitarian 
reasons.
‘Responsibility to Protect’ is a principle 
in international relation whose aim is to 
prevent mass destruction, war crime, ethnic 
extermination, and crime against humanity. 
This principle declares that every state has 
the responsibility to protect its citizens from 
the four international crime as mentioned 
earlier. Also, international community has the 
responsibility to help the states unable to fulfill 
such duty. If, due to certain causes, a state is 
unable or lacks the willingness to protect its 
citizens, the responsibility to save and protect 
the human rights of the said state then falls to 
the international community.
The concept of RtoP has been formulated 
to solve dire problem of humanity. This concept 
was first proposed by The International 
Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) formed by the government 
of Canada on September 2000. The formation 
of this commission was related with the 
controversy of NATO’s bombing of Kosovo, 
and the statement of Kofi Annan about how 
international community should react to 
serious and systematic violation of human rights 
that could threaten humanity. In short, the 
commission describes is mandate as followed:
“Generally to build a broader understanding 
of the problem of reconciling intervention 
for human protection purposes and 
sovereignty; more specifically, it was to 
try to develop a global political consensus 
on how to move from polemics-and 
often paralysis-towards action within the 
international system, particularly through 
the United Nations.”
On December 2001, the commission 
published a report on the result of several 
consultations and findings. The commission 
basically proposes the acceptance of the RtoP 
concept-the responsibility of the international 
community to protect the individuals whose 
basic rights are threatened or violated. The 
report of the Commision argues that a state has 
the responsibility to protect its citizen’s human 
rights. If it is unable or unwilling to fulfill this 
responsibility, for instance in the case of mass 
killing, its sovereignty is temporarily being 
suspended. In such cases, the responsibility to 
protect the citizens shifted to the international 
community. It might be said that the concept 
of Responsibility to Protect attempts to give 
solution the uncertainty of legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention that still debatable 
in international sphere.
The ICISS report on RtoP gives an idea 
to re-conceptualize sovereignty as implying 
responsibility. Sovereignty was re-characterized 
from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as 
responsibility in both internal and external 
duties. As a result, sovereignty implies that state 
authorities have the primary responsibility to 
protect the safety and lives of its citizens. It also 
means that government officials are responsible 
internally to their people and externally to the 
international community. 
The main idea brought by the ICISS report 
is the changing of term from ‘right to intervene’ 
into ‘responsibility to protect’. At the core of 
responsibility to protect lies the assumption 
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that sovereignty does not constitute a right of 
a state against intervention from other states 
but also encompasses a state’s responsibility 
to protect people under its control. It can be 
argued that a state can no longer hide behind 
the shield of sovereignty and claiming of non-
intervention from other states in internal 
affairs, if it fails to protect their people under its 
jurisdiction from massive violations of human 
rights. 
The report of ICISS divides the responsibility 
to protect into three sub responsibilities: 
the responsibility to prevent, to react and to 
rebuild. The responsibility to prevent consist of 
measures aimed to avoid massive human rights 
violations and highlight the importance of early 
warning mechanism and root-cause conflict 
prevention, as well as diplomatic, economic and 
military instrument to confine a conflict before 
it escalates.22 The responsibility to rebuild 
comprises responsibilities which arise after a 
conflict, particularly after a military intervention 
has been conducted and aims to support the 
sustainable development of a stable and safe 
society. The responsibility to react constitutes 
the normative core of the responsibility to 
protect. It applies when massive human rights 
violations occur in a state and that state is 
either unable or unwilling to protect its citizens. 
In this case, coercive measures short of military 
action should be taken, including diplomatic, 
economic or military sanction. However, 
military action should only be acceptable in 
extreme case of large scale loss of life or ethnic 
cleansing and when four criteria are met: (1) 
military intervention has to be motivated by the 
right intention; (2) they must be last resort; (3) 
they must be proportional; (4) there must be a 
reasonable chance of ending the suffering.23 
In the 2005 World Summit, states finally, 
after a drawn-out debate, through their 
respective heads of government, agreed to 
accept the concept of R2P in the paragraph 
138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome 
Document. The two paragraphs explicitly 
mention that it does not only accept the 
RtoP concept, but also imposes new duty and 
responsibility for international community 
to protect its population from genocide, 
extermination of ethnics, and crime against 
humanity. This formulation refers to the 
international crime, and could rightly be 
considered a step forward from the ICISS Report 
which declares that in case of disaster where a 
state could no longer solve it alone without help 
of the international community, while human 
lives are at stake, it could rightly legitimate 
intervention from international community for 
humanitarian reasons.24 
D. Responsibility to Protect : Is It A Legal Norm?
Many law experts questioning whether 
the RtoP concept is a soft law, or merely a 
political norm. Even to consider the concept 
a replacement for the concept of sovereignty 
and humanitarian intervention still requires 
solid supporting arguments. Some experts 
even went as far as considering RtoP a political 
slogan.25 Many parties recommended that RtoP 
is promoted to be a principle of international 
22 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect” (December 2001), para. 3.1
23 Ibid., para. 4.19, 4.32-43. 
24 Cristina Gabriela Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect-Security and Human Right, New York: 
Routledge, 2011, p. 120. 
25 Carsten Stahn, “Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jan, 2007), p. 
99-120.
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law by the collective commitments of the states 
all around the world. Some parties even stated 
that there are new elements contained in RtoP, 
but rather owe its root to a wider ideology or to 
an existing, widely applied legal tradition. 
The concept of RtoP is actually based on the 
existing international laws. Despite its recycled 
nature, it succeeds in redefining sovereignty as 
authority into sovereignty as responsibility. It 
packs a warning to states that the sovereignty 
they hold is not a sort of legitimacy, a ‘ticket’ for 
them to act as they please in their own border. 
Instead, states are supposed to protect and 
recognize the rights of its citizens. The emphasis 
is on the falling of responsibility to international 
community, should a state fails in carrying out 
its duty. Again, the weight of the responsibility 
is for the international community to share, 
rather than being upheld by a single particular 
state. 
This concept of intervention has long been 
developing in the international law system, but 
it has never had a concrete law base. The UN 
Charter indeed allows restrictive use of force, 
only for the UN Security Council and act of self-
defense. However, in its practice, the prohibition 
of the use of force has often been breached by 
a state or a group of state. The RtoP concept 
legitimates the Security Council who holds the 
primary authority, with prevention, protection, 
and rebuilding as its main goals.
The concept of RtoP at first was challenged 
by developing countries apart from the major 
power. There was a worry that the concept 
became a legitimation for the developed states 
to conduct an intervention towards another 
state, under the guise of providing protection. 
On the other hand, there was also an optimism 
that this concept could strengthen the role of 
the Security Council, so that its legitimacy and 
credibility would improve. However, the failure 
of the Security Council to take action in Darfur 
case, for example, shown that it is not easy to 
implement this concept into practice.
Additionally, the mechanisms through 
which the RtoP can be implemented are 
consistent with existing international law. 
Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit 
Outcome Document identify four principal ways 
in which RtoP can be implemented, each of which 
is consistent with existing international law: (a) 
the primary responsibility rests with the State 
itself. This is the cornerstone of sovereignty; 
(b) the international community may provide 
assistance, such as capacity-building, mediation 
and diplomacy. Such assistance may only 
be provided at the request and with the 
express consent of the state concerned and is 
consistent with the state’s sovereign right to 
make bilateral and multilateral agreements; (c) 
the UN Security Council might take measures in 
a manner consistent with Chapters VI ,VII and 
VIII of the UN Charter, the General Assembly 
might make recommendations on the basis 
of Article 11 of the Charter, and other Organs 
of the UN might act in accordance with the 
Charter; (d) paragraph 139 of the World Summit 
Outcome Document explicitly envisages a role 
for regional arrangements. Such roles must be 
consistent with the charters, constitutions or 
guiding principles of the regional arrangement 
concerned and with the UN Charter. It might 
said that if we are comparing the concept of 
RtoP and humanitarian intervention, RtoP has 
stronger base in the international law, since 
it is adopted by the General assembly in its 
meetings and being exercised by the Security 
Council.26 
26 UN. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 99thplen. mtg. at 18, UN Doc A/63/PV.99 (July 24, 2009).
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In addition, comparing humanitarian 
intervention and RtoP, it is quite obvious 
that the RtoP offer much more that only 
intervention. As mentioned earlier that the 
doctrine encompasses the responsibility to 
prevent, to react and to rebuild. It is quite clear 
that the doctrine is not emphasizing on the 
intervention itself. Rather it is also focusing on 
how to prevent the violations of human rights 
that might occured as well as the steps should 
be taken in order to restore the condition back 
into normal before the violations happened. 
The doctrine, indeed, give an important insight 
into the ways in which effective human rights 
protection can be established and maintained. 
With regards to the question of the legal 
status of the RtoP doctrine, this article wants 
to present an option categorizing this doctrine 
as a source of international law, specifically the 
customary international law. Is this categorizing 
acceptable?
The customary international law is the 
second source of international law found in 
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of International 
court of justice as “an international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” 
International court of justice has established 
the international custom as a source of 
international law through some of its decisions, 
like in Nicaragua Case where stated that 
there are two elements of international law, 
the objective element (general practice) and 
subjective element (generally accepted as law 
or opinion juris, and in Asylum Case: Columbia 
v. Peru (1950) where the International court 
of justice described custom as “a constant and 
uniform usage, accepted as law.” Often, the 
debate is on whether one condition is enough 
to be called customary international law. There 
must be a rate of repetition in a particular 
time period, which has served as reference to 
the International court of justice.27 However, it 
needs to be considered also that International 
court of justice declared this only in the context 
of Asylum case, which is: “The facts… disclose 
so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much 
fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise 
of diplomatic asylum and in the official views 
expressed on various occasions… that it is not 
possible to discern… any constant and uniform 
usage, accepted as law”. In the case, Victor Raul 
Haya de la Tore, the leader of the fail rebellion 
in Peru in 1948 gained protection in the 
Colombia Embassy in Lima, Peru. Colombia and 
Peru filed the case to the International court of 
justice on the matter of whether Colombia has 
the right to gain protection, or should Victor 
Raul be returned to Peru, or excommunicated 
from Peru. In other words, from this case, the 
failure to categorize a custom as a customary 
international law is not due to the rate of 
repetition, but rather due to the inconsistency 
in its practice. 
In Asylum Case, the International Court of 
Justice could not mention the proper duration 
to categorize a condition as fulfilling the criteria 
of ‘constant’ and ‘uniform’. The International 
Court of Justice has also presented the 
necessary proofs so that a repeated uniform 
conduct could be categorized as customary 
law.28 As an illustration, there is a possibility 
that a repeated practice like the honoring of 
high-ranked officer in the army of a neighboring 
country. The practice could not be considered 
as law, and is more proper to be defined as 
27 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurt’s Modern Introduction to International Law, seventh revised edition, New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 49.
28 Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law, London: Old Bailey Press, 2002, p. 15.
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honoring. The important thing is to determine 
what aspect of a practice could be considered 
as customary law international. Basically, the 
thing to be fulfilled in order for a situation to 
be considered customary international law is 
the duration of practice, the uniformity and 
consistency of practice, acceptance of the 
practice as law, opinion juris sive necessitatis 
and the generality of the practice.29 
The next question is, could RtoP could be 
categorizedas a new customary international 
law? The emergence of the RtoP concept 
has been widely recognized and discussed in 
international political discourses, especially 
on its legal status in international law. Can the 
RtoP concept be categorized as a customary 
international law? Has this concept become 
a customary norm? Does this concept show 
a conceptual shift in viewing sovereignty 
that would indirectly lead to the significant 
alteration of law? The concept of RtoP has been 
considered as emerging principle of customary 
international law in the report of ICISS. The 
High Level Panel Report30 also mentions that 
RtoP is an emerging norm. However, the World 
Summit Outcome Document mentions nothing 
about the legal status of the RtoP.
The first problem in determining R2P as 
emerging norm is the ambiguity of the concept 
itself.31 This concept does not only change 
along its development but also becomes 
ambiguous for trying to combine several 
theories and thoughts into a single concept. 
When first developed by the ICISS, the concept 
of RtoP consisted of the conceptual change of 
sovereignty which tried to develop the criteria 
and operational principles for intervention. 
The RtoP concept attempted to combine legal, 
political, and moral norms. To form a single 
law by the combination of the three norms isa 
very difficult aim, even with the consideration 
of the possible variation of concrete structures 
of norms, with some legal norms being more 
open than others, and some legal norms being 
principles and not law.32 Not all aspects of law 
could rightly be constructed as legal duty and 
right. RtoP is formed as a comprehensive basic 
structure for the prevention and management 
of the severe violation of human rights. 
However, not all aspects of the RtoP concept 
could become legal norms. 
If the concept of RtoP is narrowly 
interpreted and is focused on the specific 
duty of a state or international community to 
protect, take measures, and rebuild, then it is 
not easy to interpret it as legal norms. Duty 
and responsibility should be interpreted as two 
different legal concepts. However, it does not 
mean that RtoP has no normative element. In 
the context of international law, responsibility 
is used to assign the possible consequence 
due to violation of international obligation. 
The violation of international obligation is 
referred to a state, and the state conducting the 
violation has a duty according to international 
law.33 This duty stimulates the responsibility of 
29 Ibid., p. 16-19.
30 Report of the high Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 
(Dec. 2, 2004)
31 Mehrdad Payandeh, “With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process 
of International Lawmaking”, Yale Journal Of International Law, Vol. 35: 469, p. 481
32 Ibid, p. 482.
33 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex arts.1-2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83, (Jan. 28, 2002).
Padjadjaran Journal of International Law
Volume 1, Number 1, January 2017
64
a state to stop violation and to provide remedy. 
RtoP could not be considered a responsibility 
derived from the concept of state responsibility. 
The term responsibility is not only used 
technically but also generally as a synonym of 
the word obligation. When the International 
Court of Justice delivered its decision on the 
Barcelona Traction34 case, responsibility is 
defined equally as obligation. In some parts of 
the decision, the court recognizes responsibility 
in its technical form as found in the state 
responsibility. The use of this ambiguous term 
spawns an interpretation that RtoP could rightly 
considered as duty or duty to protect. The 
importance of the terminological difference 
between responsibility and obligation could be 
seen from how the U.S. rejected the proposal of 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan to accommodate 
responsibility of the international community in 
the World Summit Outcome Document.35 
In different context, the term responsibility 
shows competence and duty. Article 24 (1) of 
the UN Charter imposes some responsibility 
for the Security Council of the UN to maintain 
world peace. Meanwhile in Article 13 (2) of the 
UN Charter mentions about the responsibility 
of General assembly. In the two articles, the 
imposed responsibilities are not interpreted as 
the extension of rights and duty of these two 
UN bodies, rather it shown the competence 
of them as elaborated by the two different 
chapters in the UN Charter.
If the concept of RtoP is to be evaluated 
on whether or not it could be considered a 
customary international law as codified in 
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of International 
Court of Justice then whether or not it has 
fulfilled the two primary elements: state 
practice and opinion juris36 have to be 
examined. Considering the difficulty to identify 
these two elements, it should be clear that it 
is also difficult to see it in the context of RtoP. 
From one side, the emergence of a customary 
international law could be identified by seeing 
the statements of states or their agreements 
on that concept in the confinement of the 
UN. The verbal statement or resolution of an 
international organization could be considered 
as proof of the state practice and opinio juris.37 
However, considering the ambiguity of the RtoP 
concept, it is very difficult to determine which 
aspect of the concept actually concerns the 
elements of customary international law. This is 
because the RtoP concept has undergone many 
substantial alterations during its development. 
Thus, the implementation of RtoP in practice 
becomes unclear. 
The next emerging difficulty is related 
with the aspect of the practice by states or 
other international law subjects. When the 
RtoP concept consistsof several measures that 
could possibly be taken to prevent violation 
of human rights in a particular state, it should 
be easy to use it to identify the relation 
between the reactions of a group of states or 
international organizations in a particular case. 
For example, related with the case of Darfur, the 
issued resolution of the UN’s Security Council is 
classified as a form of implementation of RtoP. 
However, in relation with the practical aspect 
34 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex arts.1-2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83, (Jan. 28, 2002).
35 Op.cit., p. 483.
36 Seecases : Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 1986 danNorth Sea Continental Shelf (FRG 
v. Netherland), 1969.
37 LihatkasusLegality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua, 1986; Fisheries Jurisdiction (FRG v. Iceland), 1974.
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of a state, can the measures taken by the UN 
Security Council be considered in line with 
such aspect? Furthermore, often the emerging 
problem is when a state or a group of states act 
without referring to RtoP, but rather conducts 
an intervention towards the sovereignty of 
other states (as with the case of Kosovo and 
NATO in 1999). Thus, when a state or a group 
of state imposes a sanction upon a state as a 
response to violation of human rights in that 
state, it could interpreted that the state or the 
group of state has implemented the concept of 
RtoP, which is the duty to act or to perform, or it 
could be said that the state or the group of state 
act on the basis of RtoP.
E. Conclusion
The basic differences between humanitarian 
intervention with the Responsibility to Protect 
that RtoP offer more comprehensive measures 
to respond such a violations of human rights. Not 
only the reactive action in form of intervention, 
instead it also emphasis on the prevention and 
rebuilding measures. These three methods 
that makes RtoP seen as an improvement for 
the humanitarian intervention that considered 
only emphasizing on ‘reactions’. Moreover, 
constructing the concept of RtoP as customary 
international law is very difficult. This is because 
the concept of RtoP develops not in a period of 
absence of law, rather it grows within an existing 
law. The concept of RtoP concerns existing and 
recognized legal norms in international law, like 
the legitimacy of the Security Council based on 
the Article 39 of the UN Charter and based on 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter regarding severe 
violation of human rights. The legitimacy of this 
UN body is an integral part of the RtoP concept. 
Thus, if the RtoP concept is to be considered an 
emerging norm or even customary international 
law, it could be indirectly interpreted that the 
legitimacy of the UN Security Council goes 
only as far as customary international law or 
emerging norms. 
In addition, with regard to the issues 
that have been discussed, the authors raise up 
several suggestion as follows; firstly: in order to 
avoid the abuse of humanitarian intervention, 
a guideline to determine the whether the 
measures are legitimate is required. Apart 
from the guideline issued by England, an 
international document issued by the UN is 
required to become a formal guideline of the 
states regarding humanitarian intervention, 
second and lastly: a clear boundary has to be 
established in regard to the implementation 
of RtoP concept, especially in facing severe 
violation of human rights in a particular state. 
This is necessary to avoid abuse of the concept 
by a group of states or even by the UN for 
hidden political agenda. 
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